This paper examines how diversely organized capitalist societies evolve by analyzing the transformation of Japan's financial system since the 1990s. The banking, securities, and insurance, as well as the postal financial institutions changed significantly, but are hardly converging to Anglo-American or 'liberal market' models. We contend that Japan's new financial system is best characterized as syncretic, with new, traditional and hybrid forms of practices, organizations and norms coexisting. Syncretism in industry was driven by a distinctive pattern of interest group politics we call syncretization. Strong political leadership, facing serious electoral threats, shifted the policy logic from gradual incremental reforms following traditional interest group dynamics, to rapid reforms that excluded the traditionally powerful interest groups most affected by these reforms. We support the notion that diverse industry outcomes can be complementary to broader political economy reforms that take Japan away from its traditional model, part of a broader 'convergence towards diversity'.
Introduction
The question of how capitalist societies, diversely organized, evolve in an age of everincreasing internationalization has been a longstanding area of scholarly inquiry. 1 Mechanisms of institutional change in particular have been a recent focus, as political scientists and sociologists move beyond simple models of exogenous, shock-precipitated change to examine a variety of gradual transformations and patterns of change. 2 One core element of how each political economy is organized, and consequently a key driver of how each changes, has been the financial system, from which other aspects such as corporate governance and employment patterns stem.
3 Yamamura and Streeck, 2003 To examine processes of institutional change more closely, we analyze the financial system of Japan, a country traditionally situated at one extreme in almost all typologies of how diverse capitalist systems are organized; Japan, along with Germany, has long been considered the polar opposite of Anglo-American, market-centered models of capitalism, described variously as a non-liberal ( ) or coordinated market economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001) , with a bank-centered financial system with heavy state intervention to shape the economy (Zysman, 1983 ).
An examination of extremes-Japan in this case-often reveals processes of change most clearly. Japan's financial system is a valuable object of inquiry since it has greatly transformed over the past couple decades, in part by incorporating many aspects of Anglo-American financial systems, but convergence does not seem likely any time soon. Instead, Japan has crafted a more diversified financial system that has retained some of the features of a non-liberal system, adopted some features of an Anglo-American system, and also created some new practices that are distinct from any pre-existing systems. This non-convergence, in a form we term syncretism, has actually shielded Japan's financial system from the 2008 global financial crisis that severely damaged financial sectors worldwide. 4 Therefore, understanding how Japan's financial system is now configured, and uncovering the mechanisms of how it transformed, provide useful insights into the fast-growing scholarship exploring processes of institutional change.
The "new" are best represented by foreign investment banks, securities firms, insurers, and some new Japanese entrants. They introduced new business models (such as derivatives and annuities), practices (particularly regarding employment and inter-firm relations), and norms (their perceived raison d'etre to maximize profit, and especially for many foreign firms, maximize shortterm shareholder returns).
The "hybrid," which melds traditional and new elements, are best represented by the three major financial groups, Mizuho, Mitsubishi UFJ, and Mitsui Sumitomo, centered around their respective mega-banks. The mega-banks were created by mergers between historical main banks, and the financial groups, organized as holding companies, were allowed to expand into previously restricted areas such as securities, trust banking, and insurance. The financial groups embrace a combination of new and old business models (ranging from traditional deposits to foreign currency denominated accounts and a variety of annuities and insurance products), multiple forms of employment practices (traditional seniority-based banks versus performance oriented securities subsidiaries, for example), as well as new and old inter-firm relations (acting as relational "main banks," but also entering into joint ventures and tie-ups with foreign financial institutions).
The "old" are exemplified by regional banks, which overwhelmingly retain traditional strategies (continued heavy reliance on retail banking), organizational structures (main bank relationships, seniority based hierarchies) and norms (regionally based with close ties to local governments, emphasis on relationship banking as a key source of client information).
The postal system has also become a combination of the new, old, and hybrid. The corporate form is new, with the corporatized Japan Post Holding Company fully owning the bank, insurance, and postal services as subsidiary companies. Top management was given to private sector businessmen, with a new concern for profitability, and employees-including postmasters-are no longer public servants. The postal companies also offer new products and services, such as mutual funds and credit cards, with tie-ups to foreign firms' insurance and annuity products. At the same time, Japan Post Bank is a hybrid in that the government currently still owns 100% of the shares of the parent holding company, with plans for the government to retain one third of the shares. This hybrid ownership form, where the organization is that of a corporatized holding company but the controlling shares belong to the state, has led to calls of unfair competition from Japan Post's private sector and foreign competitors. However, the core business remains traditional: the Japan Post Bank takes retail deposits through its nationwide network, and it is a significant buyer of Japanese government bonds-about one third of the 700 trillion yen Japanese Government Bond (JGB) market.
In Japan's new financial system, the new, old, and hybrid coexist. Table 1 shows the roughly similar deposits amounts in each area. Note that the total amount of deposits in Japan's sixty-odd regional banks even slightly exceeded those of city banks (including mega-banks and some others) by 2010. And the Japan Post Bank, as a single financial institution, still dwarfs the mega-banks. (See Table 2) [insert Table 1 here]
[insert Table 2 here]
Syncretization: The Pattern and Process of Change
The core question posed by this paper is: how and why did this observed syncretism in Japan's financial sectors occur?
The diversification of financial sectors into new, traditional, and hybrid components is not entirely an expected outcome given the most common expressions of the idea of institutional complementarity. In the influential thrust of scholarship on comparative capitalisms, 7 institutions are considered complementary, or having a good "fit" with one another when the presence of one enhances the function of another, and so on, creating a matrix of interlocking institutions.
8
Piecemeal change should therefore be difficult, and it may be expected to lower overall performance. 9 It also raises the question of whether the observation of syncretism in Japan is simply transitory-is it an interlude before the set of institutions converge to a new set of complementarities (closer to an Anglo-American model, for example), or will they revert back to a more traditional Japanese mode.
Our observation of syncretic outcomes also raises the issue of the process of change. A prominent thrust of scholarship is aimed at understanding gradual but transformative change that arises endogenously rather than from exogenous shocks. Pierson (Pierson, 2003) brings attention to time horizons in the causes and outcomes of change, and Streeck and Thelen (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) articulate several patterns of gradual institutional change. Mahoney and Thelen (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010 ) go on to stipulate the political conditions, in terms of veto possibilities and characteristics of the target institutions, for each pattern of change to occur. The question for this study is therefore: was syncretism in Japan's financial sectors a case of gradual transformative change, and if so, does it follow previously identified patterns?
The main contentions of this paper are as follows. The pattern of change entailed a period of gradual adjustment, with incremental regulatory reforms driving marginal changes in industry dynamics, followed by a burst of regulatory reform that significantly reshaped the actors, business strategies, and patterns of interaction to create the observed syncretic outcome. Particularly in the case of Japn Post, the burst of reforms was followed by partial retrenchment of those reforms over a longer period.
The driver of change was political-a particular pattern of interest group politics we call syncretization. The prolonged gradual adjustment period was driven by traditional interest group politics. At the junctures of rapid change, however, major political thrusts for reform were driven by acute electoral concerns over the party's survival in power. Traditional political bargains and historical industry-level policy processes were discarded by the political leadership calling for reform as a platform for survival.
The key point is that the actors pushing for reform were not the incumbent, traditionally powerful interest groups most affected by reform. The impetus for reform came, instead, from strong political leadership spearheading reform as a critical electoral strategy for the party's survival. Since the incumbent major players in the financial system were not pushing for reforms, only some financial players immediately rushed to embrace the new possibilities they enabled.
Hence, the coexistence of old, new, and hybrid elements. Moreover, particularly for postal reforms, since the interests pushing reforms were not of those being reformed, once the political leadership lost its strong drive for reform, the process slowed, and even reversed in some cases.
Implications for Understanding Institutional Change
In order to theorize about institutional change, Campbell (Campbell, 2004) reminds us to carefully specify the institutions we examine. Regarding the conceptualization of institutions themselves, while various notions of institutions have developed over the past few decades, we settle with an increasingly widespread middle-of-the-road conception: 1) they include formal and informal "rules of the game," which can include external structures and cognitive frames, and 2) they include not only the rules of the game, but also how those rules are concretely played out (Djelic, 2010, p. 33 ).
In the financial sector, the main rules of the game include: the formal legal regulatory framework as ultimately determined by politicians, bureaucratic discretion to interpret and enforce the regulatory framework, and firm strategies about how to operate-both in markets and in political strategies to influence policy. Norms play a significant role in determining what firms are maximizing (e.g., shareholder returns versus longevity as a corporate entity), and how they pursue strategies in the face of uncertainty (e.g. business models, and how and when to lobby the government for what), particularly when governance structures provide leeway for interpretive ambiguity (such as shareholders not actively demanding immediate maximum returns).
This paper finds that the "rules of the game" in Japan's financial sectors shifted in the following manner: in the private sector financial system, formal regulatory frameworks shifted gradually since the late 1970s, guided by bureaucratic leadership in the context of global financial market liberalization. Then, in the mid-1990s, a major thrust of political leadership-driven reform significantly accelerated liberalization while restructuring bureaucratic financial oversight. The leadership's reform focus, in turn, was driven by a normative political institutional change; for the first time since the LDP took power in 1955, it was electorally vulnerable: expectations shared by voters and the LDP of the LDP's continued rule no longer held, with electoral defeat a real possibility.
The new financial regulatory framework enabled new entrants, who brought new business models and norms into the sector, altering the dynamics of competition in many areas, shaping the new and hybrid areas. In the postal system, a far stronger, electorally motivated, politically led reform drive spearheaded legislation to corporatize and privatize the entire postal system. However, political backlash against efforts to disrupt long-practiced forms of redistributive politics gradually eroded the initial reform plans, ending in a revised Postal Privatization Law under the new political leadership in April 2012.
So where does this lead us with respect to theoretical discussions of institutional change and complementarity? First, this paper empirically supports calls by more theoretical work to reintroduce the notion of power struggles in shaping change or sustaining existing arrangements, and to avoid overly functional analysis that infer from the current function of institutions their purpose (Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Thelen, 2010) . In doing so, this study brings attention to the role of political struggles in shifting the mode and speeds of change-from a mode of gradual incremental change following a longstanding set of interest group politics, to another mode of rapid reform driven by electoral concerns and a different set of policy dynamics, and then, to a degree, back to the initial mode of incremental change. This paper's findings most closely support the theory of institutions and institutional change put forth by theoretical economist Aoki's most recent, highly sophisticated conceptual approach . He offers an alternative approach to institutions and institutional complementarity, which rejects the notion that institutional complementary necessarily constrains partial change, or that partial change causes extremely low performance.
Aoki provides a complex, game theory-centered, but far more holistic conception of institutions, complementarity and change. Aoki builds upon a concept of associational cognition to construct frameworks of the organizational architecture of firms, and how they fit within broader societal rules, which are themselves shared cognitive frames. In this conception, institutional complementarities occur as one of multiple possible strategic equilibria resulting from interactions by agents across domains. He shows how this implies that changes in quasi-parameters can shift the marginal payoffs among agents, which can then lead to conflicting strategic responses due to policy changes or the endogenous accumulation of physical or cognitive assets, which can cause conflicting strategic responses in complementary domains. (Aoki, 2010: 136) . Applying this to the Japanese context, Aoki posits that "the emerging diversity in the corporate domain and the gradual demise of the bureaucracy-mediated state in the political exchange domain are mutually complementary and reinforcing of each other." (Aoki, 2010: 167) . In other words, the shift towards a more diverse industry structure is actually complementary with Japan's postwar political economic system moving away from a policy model strongly mediated by the bureaucracy. We apply his framework more fully in the conclusion after elaborating on our findings.
The remainder of this paper examines the transformation of the private sector financial system, followed by postal system reforms. The conclusion will suggest implications and take an initial stance on how far the pattern of syncretism, driven by the politics of syncretization, might apply beyond Japan, and beyond finance.
The Private Sector Financial System
In the private sector financial system, MOF carefully managed a gradual liberalization of Japan's postwar bank-centered, government directed financial system since the late 1970s, as finance liberalized globally. Traditional interest group political patterns consisted of bureaucracymediated compromises pushed by intense lobbying from large Japanese financial institutions.
In the mid-1990s, however, Prime Minister Hashimoto's Cabinet promulgated the financial "Big Bang" reforms, driven by electoral concerns since the LDP faced unprecedented vulnerability;
shared expectations of LDP's continuing electoral victories no longer held, an institutional change in the realm of norms (Toya, 2006 These reforms departed from historical interest group political patterns. Nor did they result from political pressure from foreign firms -the largest beneficiaries of reform. Instead, the reforms were spearheaded by the political leadership despite intense industry opposition. Since the interest groups most affected (large incumbent Japanese financial institutions) were not driving the reforms, unlike in the US and UK, incumbent firms did not rush to embrace new business models and organizations. As a result, Japan's financial sectors did not converge to those of the US or UK, leaving a different configuration of strategies and firms. An unexpected benefit was Japan's financial system emerging largely unscathed from the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The primary cost was in the large inefficiencies of assets held by mega banks and regional banks not being put to productive use. In the political realm, since the financial reforms did not result from financial interest group politics, such as in the case of the US, political pressures for further reform were not particularly strong.
The Traditional "Japanese Model" of Financial Sectors and Gradual Reform
Japan's traditional financial model, commonly labeled "bank-centered," relied on a high domestic household savings rate and tightly restricted household investment opportunities. Banks and the postal system were primary repositories for capital, and MOF channeled investments into strategic sectors such as heavy industries and manufacturing. Without including the postal saving system, banks were the largest actors, followed by life insurance firms.
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The traditional industry model dominated by MOF, provided very little leeway for diversity in organization, strategy, or norms about market competition or political strategies. Through formal and informal rules, MOF compartmentalized the sector into segments such as banking, insurance, and securities, and sub-segments such as city and regional banks. MOF restricted market entry and tightly managed business models through discretionary licensing. In exchange for this control and compliance with the government's investment objectives, MOF provided implicit guarantees of financial institution rescue, usually through government-orchestrated mergers-part of shared norms between regulators and the regulated.
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The traditional policy model entailed dense informal bargaining and coordination between industry actors, MOF, and LDP politicians, usually those specializing in financial affairs (known as "zoku" politicians).
The result was a remarkable homogeneity in products and services across firms, which led to policy strategies of cultivating interpersonal relationships with MOF officials; "MOF-tan" were employees whose sole mission was to court, wine and dine MOF officials to obtain information and curry favor.
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Gradual reforms began in the late 1970s, carefully managed by MOF (
The industry associations for banks and life insurers were powerful political players by way of funding LDP politicians.
Vogel, 1994). 13 Vogel, 1996 MOF gradually de-compartmentalized the sectors and incrementally deregulated business models restrictions such as brokerage fees ( ), carefully maintaining balance between each segment, such as matching new privileges in securities (such as trading in the secondary market for certificates of deposits), with banks (such as participation in bond futures markets) (Rosenbluth, 1989, p. 155) .
Put into Streeck and Thelen's (2005) typology of institutional change, the MOF-orchestrated gradual liberalization can be considered a process of "conversion," in which old institutions are deployed to new ends. The regulatory framework including compartmentalization and licensing, originally established to effectively channel investment towards strategic ends, was used to incrementally liberalize the sector.
The Financial "Big Bang" Reforms
The 
The Politics Driving the "Big Bang" Reforms: Syncretization
The Big Bang financial reforms were spearheaded by political leadership within the LDP, as the party faced unprecedented electoral vulnerability. As the LDP sought broad public approval, MOF lost control of the reform agenda and financial industry interest groups, with the most to lose, were largely excluded from the process (Toya, 2006) . In short, the industry most affected by the reforms did not have a significant voice in the reform process.
This contrasted Great Britain's financial "big bang" reforms of the 1980s, in which the cartel of British brokerages lobbied for deregulation to compete against US firms, recognizing that failure to do so would obliterate their global competitive presence (Laurence, 2001 ). Japan's financial markets were experiencing a similar "hollowing out" by the mid-1990s, but domestic financial firms were not lobbying for liberalization; Japan's "big bang" was not the result of domestic corporate lobbying.
The politics of Japan's Big Bang reforms differed considerably between the first phase, promulgation of the reform initiative in 1996, and the second phase, the detailed reform plan of 1997 and implementation.
In the first, phase, corporate interest groups were almost entirely absent. The LDP at the Toya, 2006, pp. 165-166) . The LDP was also catering to the strong demands of its coalition partners, Sakigake and JSP, who wanted to avoid being blamed for taxpayer costs incurred by being coalition partners with the LDP in its reform efforts. They insisted that the MOF, who had been preparing for a more modest reorganization of its financial supervisory functions, be split apartand the LDP agreed (Hiwatari, 2000) .
At the time, the financial industry was weakened by multiple crises and scandals, and MOF, which had worked to protect the industry, was under serious attack. A wave of credit cooperatives bankruptcies and regional bank failures in 1994 were followed in 1995 by the seven jusen housing loan companies facing insolvency. Many of these firms had retired MOF officials in upper management and received special regulatory treatments.
16 Toya, 2006, p. 161 Their losses amounted to 6.4
trillion yen, and a public bailout of 685 billion yen was incredibly unpopular -a 1996 poll by the Asahi Shimbun reported 87% of the public opposed ( ). Large financial institutions were unwilling to shoulder the bailout as MOF initially hoped, fueling MOF unpopularity and voices of concern from the LDP's coalition partners as well (Hiwatari, 2000) .
Other scandals, such as Daiwa Bank's losses from illegal bond trading in New York, leading to US government publically criticizing MOF for not acting on prior knowledge, further weakened MOF. A "Japan Premium" developed, in which international financial institutions charged interest premiums on all transactions with Japanese banks in the inter-bank call market due to the lack of trust in MOF's supervision and Japanese financial institutions' financial wellbeing. Between 1994 and 1996, wining and dining scandals with Japanese financial firms lavishly entertaining MOF officials made headlines, leading to an unprecedented dismissal of MOF's two most senior officials (Toya, 2006) . The life insurance sector was also declining, partly due to the post-bubble economic slump, with the number of life insurance subscribers peaking in 1994. Many were in a financially vulnerable position, stuck with investment portfolios that yielded less than their "guaranteed return rates" promised to subscribers, due to the restricted investment targets and the low interest rate adopted by the government attempting to stimulate the economy (Mitsuno, 2006) .
In short, domestic and international public opinion of Japan's financial institutions and MOF hit all-time lows, just when the LDP was most sensitive to broader public opinion and vulnerable to the demands of coalition partners.
In the second phase, Hashimoto, bolstered by an electoral victory for the LDP, immediately moved to enact his reform agenda. Finance was central to his broader "Six Major
Reforms" and Hashimoto wanted to push through reforms from the cabinet level rather than through PARC committees with zoku politicians. The LDP was not interested in consulting the broader industry at this juncture (Toya, 2006) .
MOF promptly supplied its reform plan, already having lost the battle over its breakup.
Interested in preserving what public favor it could, it bypassed the standard industry consultations to avoid accusations of being too close to industry. MOF therefore worked to enlist the support of the mass media, trading companies, and manufacturing firms. A top official is quoted as saying:
"Had we consulted the industries, they would have opposed us. We knew that public opinion would be on our side… It was obvious that deregulated businesses would be in trouble.
Thus we could not consult those industries that would have faced trouble due to deregulation." (Sakakibara and Tahara, 1999, pp. 135-136) .
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The financial industry was further weakened in 1997 with a series of racketeering scandals involving paying off organized crime to avoid disrupting shareholders' meetings, 18 Toya, 2006 reducing the industry's clout in narrowing the breadth and slowing down the reforms. Thus, large financial firms with the most to lose from the reforms succeeded only in slowing down the implementation of cross-entry into different segments by somewhat credibly pointing to the possibility of a wave of bankruptcies. Securities firms lobbied for a "soft landing," with complete brokerage commission liberalization in 1998, and bank subsidiaries waiting until 1999 to enter the securities businesses. The insurance industry, aided by incumbent foreign insurers who mobilized US diplomatic pressure, successfully lobbied to delay bank entry into insurance until 2001, and even then, limiting bank participation initially ( ). The insurance industry association was faced with a preoccupation on how to rescue and resuscitate a string of mid-sized life insurers that had failed, and was not in a strong bargaining position (Kushida, 2010) .
Significantly, those with the most to gain -foreign financial institutions -were not strongly lobbying for the Big Bang reforms. Foreign diplomatic pressure mobilized by financial firms peaked in the mid to late 1980s over the issue of market entry. Once inside, however, they did not organize into strong political associations, since their positions did not necessarily align on several key issues; some with longstanding ties to the Japanese government preferred to remain independent, while others were leery of political involvement (Pauly, 1987) . Moreover, foreign firm industry associations within Japan, separated from major Japanese industry associations until after the Big Bang, were seldom organized to exert political pressure. For example, the Foreign Banking Association established in 1984 revolved around European banks, represented only about 40% foreign banks, and was primarily an information exchange association rather than lobbying organization.
For many foreign firms, significant investments into Japan's existing industry arrangements deterred them from liberalization or new entry. For example, joining the Tokyo Stock Exchange, opened to foreign members in 1986, cost up to a billion yen (including indirect costs). The 22 foreign firms that had joined by 1988 were, unsurprisingly, silent on the issue of liberalizing commission fees that would have nullified the benefits of their exclusive membership (Laurence, 2001, p. 131) . This was understandable, since, historically, liberalization of privileged foreign market segments, such as dollar denominated "impact loans" had rapidly dried up in the face of competition from new entrants, both foreign and domestic (Pauly, 1987) .
In short, the policy process for the Financial Big Bang reforms departed considerably from the ongoing gradual reform process orchestrated by MOF. Driven by electoral considerations, in the context of Japan's political logic, and prevailing circumstances weakening traditionally powerful interest groups, the political leadership drove a strong reform agenda. 19 The nature of the reforms led to syncretism in market outcomes.
Market Outcomes of the Financial "Big Bang": Syncretism
The financial Big Bang reforms transformed the logic of competition in Japan's financial industry in a syncretic form. Foreign firms and new entrants took advantage of new opportunities to offer services and products, becoming highly profitable. Incumbent Japanese firms were disadvantaged, since their organizations and strategies were optimized for previous regulatory conditions of limited products and services. While free to enter new business areas, their existing workforces lacked the necessary expertise, and radical workforce reductions were legally difficult and normatively prohibitive. After years of adjustment, many incumbents adopted hybrid structures, with holding companies, multiple employment structures, and diverse market strategies. Regional banks, with neither the resources nor the will to transform thoroughly, overwhelmingly adhered to traditional structures and strategies (Shimizu, 2009 ).
The New: New Actors, New Strategies, New Products and Services
The new areas of finance that the Big Bang reforms introduced entailed truly dramatic changes. Foreign firms, previously confined to relatively niche segments, became major players in almost all areas of Japanese finance. In the securities industry they became highly profitable, pioneering Wall Street-type employment with high salaries and bonuses, little job security, and fluid labor mobility among firms for mid-career professionals. The performance gap between domestic and foreign firms was particularly stark in securities. In 1996, the Japan Securities Dealers' Association's Japanese members' operating profits dropped 40% from the previous year while that of foreign securities firms grew an incredible 21
fold (TDB, 1998, p. 370) . The breadth of foreign activity increased dramatically after the Big Bang reform. After 1998, Japan's financial Big Bang reforms enabled foreign trust banks to offer dollardenominated overseas investment trusts. Combined with Japan's low interest rates and banking crisis, this led to an inflow of Japanese savings; between 1998 and 1999, despite overall shrinkage of Japanese corporate pension funds entrusted to major Japanese trust banks, the nine foreign trust banks recorded a 30% combined increase in corporate pension fund assets (Sato, 1999) . In the first half of fiscal 1998, the total assets held by foreign trusts increased by approximately 40% (TDB, 1999, p. 31 In 2000, the total operating income for the 238 domestic securities firms dropped 23%, reflecting a 45% drop in commission revenues, while that of the 50 foreign firms rose 33%, with revenue increasing by 44% ( ).
The Hybrid
A range of interesting hybrid organizational forms became apparent as new firms, business models, and organizations appeared after the Big Bang reforms. Most prominently, multiple employment systems emerged within single firms.
A prime example is Shinsei Bank, the former Long Term Credit Bank that became insolvent in 1998, was rescued and reformed by US investment fund Ripplewood, and began operations in June 2000. Most interestingly, it implemented a two-tiered compensation scheme.
"Permanent staff" enjoyed higher job security but lower pay, while "market staff," mostly midcareer hires and foreigners, received higher pay in return for lower job security (Vogel, 2006, pp. 182-183).
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For many of the major Japanese financial institutions, burdened with large numbers of employees and constrained from shedding them quickly due to long term employment obligations, their solution to offer new products was to partner with foreign firms. In a sense, they created financial "supply chains" by selling products created by foreign firms through their own sales networks. Japanese banks, trust banks, insurers, and even securities firms were among those that 
The Traditional
In contrast to the vast changes of the new and hybrid, regional banks by and large retained their traditional organizations, strategies, and normative underpinnings. Japan's 64 regional banks located nationwide originated from post-war government efforts to finance and rebuild regional economies. Their primary profits are from retail banking, catering to local small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The SMEs, their customers, are politically salient largely due to their numbers; over 95 percent of firms in Japan are SMEs, comprising nearly 70 percent of the labor market.
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The preferential financing available for SMEs also protects regional banks via credit guarantees. By lowering the risk associated with loans given to SMEs, credit guarantees allow regional banks to distribute loans to financially weak SMEs. These publicly funded credit guarantees also provide post-retirement positions for local officials. So long as credit guarantees exist, zombie SMEs will survive, ensuring the survival of regional banks. The lack of middle-risk loan markets also signifies the inefficiencies of this sector, and can only be explained by government intervention ( Schaede, 2004) .
The strength of regional banks' "relationship banking" strategies also sustains their continued survival in traditional form. Regional banks nurture close relationships with their SME customers over a long period of time, averaging well over 10 years for larger SMEs,
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A third factor supporting regional banks in their traditional form is the practice of each prefecture having at least one regional bank as the designated financial institution of the local government. These designated financial institutions maintain the financial stability of local public institutions, including prefectural and municipal governments. Their roles include handling fiscal giving them detailed, long-term information about their customers. Interviews with regional bank officers reveal that bankers see their SME customers at least once a week for banking purposes, but often have more frequent contact in various settings within the community. On-site visits by bankers to SMEs are not only to enhance relations to increase business, but also to get a better sense of their business performance.
cash management, managing payroll accounts of public officials, and financing local governments and their projects. These transactions, until recently without fees, are increasingly a financial burden for regional banks, but at the same time, provide precious information about regional economic health. In particular, as administrator of local tax collection for local citizens and especially businesses (taxpayers are required to make payments through their local governments' designated financial institution), they receive valuable information on the performance of individual local businesses, giving them an advantage in the SME loan market.
The Postal Savings System
Japan's postal system was reformed through a politically spearheaded drive of privatizing the entire system to bring it into competition with the rest of Japan's financial sector. Japan's postal savings system is thought to be the world's largest holder of personal savings; at its peak it held 224 trillion yen (2.1 trillion dollars) of household assets in its savings accounts (yu-cho) and an additional 126 trillion yen (1.2 trillion dollars) of household assets in its life insurance services (kampo). Together, its assets accounted for nearly a third of Japan's household assets. With these funds, the postal savings system and the postal insurance system served as key contributors to the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP). In addition to providing politicians with the funds necessary for public investment, a nationwide network of post offices and their postmasters provided organizational support for politicians. Japan's over 24,000 post offices exist in nearly every small town and village. Among them, the more politically salient are the 18,000 "special" post offices headed by commissioned postmasters. Unlike the postmasters of ordinary post offices, these commissioned postmasters were hand-picked by postal bureaucrats from among a small group of candidates -often the sons or relatives of retiring postmasters --and in many cases were pre-approved by local LDP Diet members (Maclachlan, 2011) . These postmasters in turn served as vote collecting machines and also provided logistical and financial support through organizations like the koenkai candidate support groups. In short, the postal lobby has long been seen as a key vote-gathering machine not only by rural LDP politicians but now by the opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the People's New Party members as well.
Prior to privatization efforts, the postal system offered postal and package delivery services, banking services, and life insurance all under the name of the Postal Services Agency (yusei jigyosho). It had over 400,000 employees and ran 24,700 post offices throughout Japan. The Postal Services Agency was the country's largest employer, employing one third of all government employees. As a financial institution, the Postal Services Agency's biggest advantages came from their nationwide network and their government ownership. Postal savings was a low risk, convenient option for Japanese households, especially those with lower incomes or living in remote areas with few alternative options for investment. From the viewpoint of financial competitors, however, the Postal Services Agency had unfair advantages, creating an uneven playing field and hindering competition.
Politically Driven Reform
Postal privatization, like the banking reforms discussed earlier, was a politically driven Koizumi's overall strategy in passing the privatization bills had important implications for their implementation and the ability of the opposition to limit its actual effects. While Koizumi did manage to pass the privatization bills, his strategy was to weaken the opposition by refusing to give opposing politicians in the LDP the party endorsement, rather than to strengthen the proponents of postal privatization by extolling its benefits and winning greater popular support. Such a strategy ensured the success of the reforms only as long as a strong political maverick like Koizumi remained in power. A close look at the electoral outcome of September 2005 suggests that Koizumi and his allies won votes from voters that were against the opposition parties who were unable to provide a compelling alternative to postal privatization. The LDP share of the popular vote increased only marginally over the previous election whereas of the 16 anti-postal privatization candidates, 13 still won. Thus the bill passed but narrowly. This meant that the opposition to postal privatization remained quite strong, leaving the reform vulnerable to future political compromises. The weakness of passing rule changes (the postal privatization bill) despite resistance from the very actors they target (postmasters and consumers) is that unless the opposition is weakened over time (such as through market forces in the case of private sector finance) the new rules can be circumvented, or even reversed, as the trend appears to be so far.
Postal Privatization and its Outcomes
The While corporatization was an intermediary step, it initiated a number of reforms that incentivized Japan Post to think and act more like a corporation than a government agency. Top management of its three divisions, Postal Service, Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance fell in the hands of businessmen, mostly former corporate executives rather than the traditional retiring bureaucrats. Profitability became a concern, placing operating pressure on mail services and the network of post offices. Such pressures prompted the innovation of new products such as mutual funds and entry into new services like credit cards. These changes allowed Japan Post to early on taste the benefits of privatization while maintaining a de facto 100 percent government guarantee through government ownership, a situation that continues today.
The The growing voice of protest against such expansions from the private sector and foreign companies upset about the statutory, regulatory, and other governmental privileges afforded JPI attests to the considerable expansion of JPI.
Retrenching to a Hybrid Form
However, as the economy continued to suffer from deflation and the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis-sparked recession, the public began to side with those opposed to full privatization. Riding this momentum, in November 2009, then DPJ Prime Minister Yukio
Hatoyama froze the sale of shares in Japan Post's financial units, a significant retreat from Koizumi's pro-market reforms. In so doing, Hatoyama tried to appeal to those who saw Koizumi's reforms as excessively market-friendly, a line he touted during his party's landslide victory earlier that year. At 330 trillion yen ($3.6 trillion) in assets (240 trillion yen in Japan Post Bank), although Japan Post Holdings by then accounted for only one fifth of Japan's total financial assets, down from its peak at one third, a significant portion now funded Japanese government bonds.
The current status of postal privatization is a combination of the old, the new, and the hybrid. public servants and are thus free to actively participate in political activities (Maclachlan, 2011) .
The postmasters are by no means as electorally influential as they once were, but they have retained enough political influence to win over the DPJ and its supporters.
In April [insert Chart 2] The revision to the postal privatization bill also stipulated that on October 2012, Japan Post
Service Company (mail delivery) and Japan Post Network Company (window services) are expected to merge. Proponents of reform see serious pitfalls in this merger, as this raises the risk of systemic shock to Japan's financial system. The Commission report by Naoki Tanaka (March 2012) states that combining these delivery and network business companies with a holding company would raise serious doubts about isolating two of the world's largest financial institutions from the holding company's business risk. Rising levels of risk aside, however, this merger also creates a type of hybrid between a government-owned holding company and a privately held corporation. In regulatory terms, cross-subsidization among subsidiaries of the holding company Japan Post is only permitted due to Japan Post's status as a government owned business; in contrast, private holding companies must let subsidiaries go bankrupt.
At the same time, however, the revision paves the way for greater expansion of Japan Post into new business areas. The revisions do not permit unfettered expansion into areas already dominated by the private sector, but the legislation does open the door for new businesses and lower the barrier to entry.
Conclusion
This paper has examined reforms to Japan's financial system, which lies at the core of its model of capitalism. We characterized the observed outcome of its transformation as syncretism, the coexistence of traditional, new, and hybrid organizational structures, strategies, and norms.
Analyzing changes in both the private sector financial system and the postal system, we contend that syncretic industry outcomes were driven by a particular pattern of interest group politics, which we call syncretization, which in turn drove a distinct pattern of reform. Major thrusts of reform occurred when political leadership overwhelmed traditionally powerful vested interests; however, when the leadership advocating reform waned, the vested interests substantially slowed further reform.
Implications for Change in Japan
Within scholarship of Japan's transformation since the 1990s Aoki and Jackson and Miyajima, 2007; Schaede, 2008) , given the recent developments in postal reform, this study provides one of the first political analyses of both the traditional financial sectors and postal financial system. It adds to scholarship revealing how political logic shapes institutional change in core sectors.
There are several implications for Japan's financial system. First, we expect Japan's financial system to exhibit syncretism for at least the short to medium term, so far as the traditional and hybrid portions, in particular regional banks and mega-banks, remain stable. Japanese household savings remains overwhelmingly within domestic deposit institutions, providing them with ample sources of capital. While some areas of the system such as securities and investment banking are rapidly adopting Anglo-American practices, other areas such as regional banks will retain their traditional structures. The growth of hybrid practices and strategies also assures that convergence to an Anglo-American model is unlikely any time soon. Questions regarding the economic efficiency of this syncretic configuration remains, but the retention of some country specific characteristics preserve diversity in the global financial system, and can perhaps serve to limit the size of global financial crises that more easily topple similarly designed systems. For Japan, the syncretic nature of financial sector reforms insulated its financial system from the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.
Second, the potential integration of Japan's postal savings and insurance systems into the mainstream financial system represents the entry of major new market-based players. Yet given the shifting political trajectory with vested interests advocating for a slowdown in reforms returning to political prominence, market integration has been substantially slowed. Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance are still wholly held by Japan Post, itself held 100 percent by the Japanese government. In short, the reversals in the privatization process have created government-owned firms that directly compete with private firms, both domestic and foreign. This is another aspect of Japan's financial system that will remain distinct from the US or UK. But while Japan may take an alternate path, these firms as they stand now have the potential of creating new headaches for the government as it attempts to steer Japan towards greater participation in both bilateral and regional trade agreements. In the recent negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership, for example, Japan has already met US opposition to plans for state-owned Japan Post Insurance to enter the cancer insurance market. Syncretism may be the outcome of politically led reforms, and may even help prevent global domino effects, but when syncretism leads to lack of conformity with liberalization trends, this can precipitate isolation and accusations of unfair play.
Implications for Understanding Institutional Change
Finally, let us return to the discussion of how this study fits within the theoretical scholarship on institutional change and complementarities. In terms of the typology put forth by Streeck and Thelen (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) (2005), 29 At a more general level, beyond Japan and beyond finance, this study therefore suggests that when analyzing institutional change, different patterns of gradual transformative change may themselves be put into motion by political forces that are driven by a separate, often electoral, logic.
the pattern of gradual change before the abrupt reforms was "conversion," with old institutions being put to new ends. After the reforms, the pattern of change follows that of "layering" in which new elements are attached to existing ones, which gradually change their status as the relative size and influence of each shifts over time. The growth and competitive success of the new players in Japan's financial system are creating new vested interests, which can affect the interest group political dynamics down the line more profoundly than the current period. However, the major reforms themselves do not fit the typology of gradual transformative change, as they were rapidly promulgated and implemented, with a different logic of change. The contribution of this study is that the rapid reforms, which reshaped the course of gradual change from conversion to layering, was driven by a political logic outside the pattern of institutional change.
Finally, this study serves as a concrete application of Aoki (2010)'s more broadly applicable framework of institutions, complementarities and change. Put simply and applied to our study, Aoki posits that the broader social-level changes that alter the political payoff for initiating economic reforms reinforce the outcomes of the reforms themselves, which create greater diversity.
Applying this to our study of Japan's financial sectors, the eroding economic performance legitimacy of the financial industry, demise in confidence that the political leadership would return the country to growth and indeed stay in power, and loss of faith in the bureaucratic leadership, were the quasi-parameter changes. This altered the strategic actions of the political leadership, which pursued reform for electoral survival. Bureaucratic actors ceded regulatory power and control over the reform process. Industry actors who were previously highly influential in the policy process did not mobilize all possible resources to thwart the reforms, since they were unlikely to succeed and wanted to avoid further political damage or the future wrath of regulators, particularly in the event that they might require bankruptcy protection later on.
The syncretic industry outcomes of new, traditional, and hybrid can therefore be thought of as an equilibrium outcome of these strategic actions among agents, and may be reasonably stable as Put simply, by applying the Aoki (2010) framework, we see that syncretic industry outcomes and syncretization as a political process can be thought of as specific equilibria outcomes among multiple possibilities. This is not a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, nor is it necessarily transitory. It shows how the co-evolution of industry and regulatory/political structure as the product of multiple strategic games is a possible alternative to conceptions of rigid institutional complementarities that would otherwise preclude partial moves away from traditional models without a systemic shock. Concrete examples include the prolonged coexistence of multiple forms of employment, corporate organization, and strategies within the same industry.
Will competition in the marketplace simply drive out the traditional in favor of the new and hybrid? Here, we must remember that the factors retaining the viability of the traditional elements (in this case regional banks and the postal bank), depend on policy factors beyond simple market competition based on economic efficiency. Until the political conditions stemming from electoral pressures shift to abolish these factors (such as the designated financial institution system or postal bank being too large to fail), then we can expect them to remain in the short-medium term.
In more general terms, beyond finance and beyond Japan, our study therefore provides an empirical grounding for the types of interactions and strategies to look for when understanding change in diversely organized capitalist systems around the world. As industries worldwide become more diverse, with previously distinct sectoral boundaries breaking down and the pervasive spread of information technology-enabled services transforming corporate activity (Zysman et al., 2013) , syncretic industry patterns are likely to become more common. To understand how these patterns come about, and to assess their trajectories of change, we posit that gradual transformative change can be punctuated by political re-bargaining, which can shift the type of change from one pattern to another. We also posit that the change itself-the co-evolution of industrial diversity and political economic transformation-can be a stable outcome of strategic games played at the corporate and societal levels. These are important building blocks towards an understanding of what Aoki calls the "convergence towards diversity" of advanced industrial countries. 20 For an empirical study of foreign stock brokerages, see (Morgan and Kubo, 2005) . 21 This was according to a 2001 survey conducted by the Japan Securities Dealers Association polling Japan's 200 largest brokerages (2001). 22 For details, see (Kushida, 2010) 23 Cerulli Associates calculations based on data from the Investment Trusts Association, the JSDA, the Japan Securities Investment Advisers Associations, and other sources. 24 For more, see (Kushida, 2010) . 25 For more on the role of SMEs in the labor market and their relationship to regional banks, see (Shimizu, 2013) . 26 Smaller SMEs tend to have shorter relationships with their banks, but this is more often due shorter lifespans of small SMEs. See the SME White Paper graph on the average length of SMEmain bank relationships Figure 2 -3-10 (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2003) . 27 For more on FILP, see (Park, 2011) 28 In 1997, deposits in private banks and the postal savings system were 474,629 billion yen and 237,782 billion yen, respectively. At the start of the privatization process in 2007, these amounts had shifted to 545,043 billion yen and 180,843 billion yen, respectively (Yoshino, 2008) . 29 Their typology includes displacement (the slowing rising salience of subordinate institutions relative to dominant ones), layering, (described in text), drift (neglect of institutions leading to slippage in practice on the ground), conversion (described in text), and exhaustion (a gradual withering away of institutions over time). 
